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Abstract
We study the behavioral underpinnings of adopting cash versus electronic payments
in retail transactions. A novel theoretical and experimental framework is developed
to primarily assess the impact of sellers’ service fees and buyers’ rewards from using
electronic payments. Buyers and sellers face a coordination problem, independently
choosing a payment method before trading. In the experiment, sellers readily adopt
electronic payments but buyers do not. Eliminating service fees or introducing rewards
significantly boosts the adoption of electronic payments. Hence, buyers’ incentives play
a pivotal role in the diffusion of electronic payments but monetary incentives cannot
fully explain their adoption choices. Findings from this experiment complement empir-
ical findings based on surveys and field data.
Keywords: money, coordination, pricing, transactions
JEL codes: E1, E4, E5
1 Introduction
In the last decades, electronic payments have gained a significant share of retail
transactions, eroding the usage share of cash and checks. For example, debit cards
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have become the most used means of payment in one third of countries across
the world (World Bank, 2011). Convenience, reliability are among the suggested
reasons for the growing popularity of electronic payments in retail transactions.
Yet, significant differences in payment method adoption persist between developed
and developing regions and several surveys show that cash enjoys a wide use also
in developed economies.1
The open issue—and the objective of this study—is to understand the empir-
ical determinants of the adoption of one payment method over another by con-
sumers and retailers. Developing such an understanding is especially important for
policymakers—central banks and government regulators—in assessing social costs
and benefits associated with the diffusion of specific payment methods.2 Unfortu-
nately the available data have two significant limitations. A main shortcoming is
that estimates of cash usage are notoriously unreliable and it is difficult to char-
acterize the relationship between relative payment costs and the adoption of a
payment method (Humphrey, 2010). An additional limitation is that the avail-
able data mostly come from survey answers that are not incentivized and therefore
are subject to a number of biases and confounds. This study takes a step towards
resolving such problems by constructing in the laboratory a prototypical retail
market in which buyers and sellers must coordinate on using a payment method.
We build on a literature that has successfully adopted experimental methodolo-
gies to empirically analyze the operation of market mechanisms (Smith, 1962),
financial markets’ (in)efficiency (Noussair and Tucker, 2103), and coordination
problems (Devetag and Ortmann, 2007; Arifovic et al., 2014; Arifovic and Jiang,
2014).
The primary goal of this study is to identify features of the experimental
1See for instance World Bank (2011). For the US, Klee (2008) reports that cash captures 54
percent of all transactions collected from scanner data at 99 grocery stores. Survey data from
Austria and Canada shows that more than 50 percent of all consumption purchases are paid
for with cash (Huyn et al., 2013).
2For example, Humphrey (2010) ranks the overall unit cost of various payment methods based
on US data and report that debit cards have the lowest cost while cash has the highest ($.90
versus $1.49). There can be also non-monetary considerations such as safety, convenience for
record-keeping, privacy, tax evasion and counterfeiting, etc. For a theoretical discussion of some
of these issues see Camera (2001) and Kahn et al. (2005).
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markets that facilitate coordination on electronic payments as opposed to cash
payments. We focus on the impact of service fees and rewards associated with
electronic payments because these monetary components are at the forefront of
the current debate (Board of Governors, 2011). In the experiment we manipulate
the cost that sellers sustain from executing an electronic transaction. This cost
represents the “merchant service fee” customarily paid by sellers to the service
provider—the seller’s financial institution.3 We also manipulate the monetary
benefit for buyers who use electronic payments, treating subjects with a monetary
“reward” from electronic purchases, which commonly takes the form of dollars,
miles, or other types of bonuses.
We construct in the lab a retail market for a homogeneous good. Before trad-
ing, buyers and sellers independently select cash or electronic payment methods,
then meet in pairs to trade. In the pair the seller acts as a monopolist, posting a
price, and then the buyer chooses a quantity. The payment methods adopted af-
fect the ability to trade and, as a result of decentralized decision-making, payment
methods’ selections might be incompatible in some trading pairs. A transaction
may fail to occur because the seller does not accept the buyer’s payment method.
The experimental design captures features that are central to the debate about
the adoption of electronic payments as opposed to cash payments. Specifically, the
design assumes that cash is legal tender and that sellers cannot price discriminate
based on the buyer’s payment method.
Analysis of the data suggests the existence of strong behavioral components
in payment methods’ adoption patterns. First, we find that sellers’ service fees
3Sellers pay a service fee (or discount fee) to the service provider of the electronic payment, which
generally takes the form of a percentage of amount transacted. The “interchange transaction
fee,” which is paid to the debit card issuer, makes up for the largest share of the service
fee (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2009). The Federal Reserve System has recently
limited interchange fees for debit cards transactions to 21 cents plus 5 basis points times the
transaction value, but only if the issuer of the debit card has more than $10 billion in assets;
the average service fee is $0.43 for exempt institutions and dropped to $0.23 for non-exempt
(Board of Governors, 2011). Credit card transactions are still exempted. Other components
of the service fee are the cost of transaction processing, terminal rental and customer service,
and the service provider’s margin. There are other fees, such as the authorization fee, paid per
authorization, communication fees, etc., but the service fee is the main one directly faced by
the merchant.
3
have a sizable impact on the diffusion of electronic payments for a reason that
is, perhaps, surprising. Service fees are paid by sellers who accept electronic
payments. However, the presence of service fees altered the buyers’ selection of
payment method significantly more than the sellers’. Sellers passed on to buyers
the anticipated service fees, as theory predicts. Some buyers therefore selected
manual payments in the hope to induce sellers to post lower prices. But this did
not lead to coordination on either payment method—consequently trade frictions
emerged and inefficiencies arose. Second, the experimental data reveal that buyers’
rewards from electronic purchases had a significant impact on buyers’ desire to
pay electronically and was very effective at enhancing the diffusion of electronic
payments in the market. The data also allows us to assess the efficiency loss
generated by mismatch in adoption of payment systems, and we find that such
inefficiency is greater when there is a greater frequency of use of cash payments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature
on retail payments. Section 3 presents the experimental design and Section 4
illustrates the theoretical predictions. Section 5 shows the empirical results on
payment methods’ adoption and aggregate efficiency, Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
There is a vast literature on payment systems. Here, we focus on empirical studies
that document how consumers’ characteristics and payment methods attributes
affect the diffusion and use of electronic payments relative to cash.
There is evidence that cash is still predominantly used in low-value transac-
tions. The literature reports a significant correlation between consumers socio-
demographic characteristics and the payment method adopted; for example, see
Arango et al. (2012) for recent Canadian survey data. Field evidence also suggests
that acceptability at the point of sale and monetary incentives are relevant vari-
ables. For instance, the study of Austrian and Canadian consumers in Huyn et al.
(2013) has documented that acceptability is central to payment method frequency
of use. Arango et al. (2011), Ching and Hayashi (2010), and Simon et al. (2010)
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report that monetary incentives such as buyer rewards and loyalty programs are
significantly associated with payment choices. Another important consideration
that emerges from field studies is the importance of the relative cost of use of pay-
ment methods for their adoption. Borzekowski et al. (2006) document this aspect
for consumers, by looking at survey data. In addition, Humphrey et al. (2001)
document the existence of a significant sensitivity to relative costs by looking at
aggregate-level field data from Norway. There is also evidence that price discrim-
ination plays a role: Bolt et al. (2010) consider survey data from the Netherlands
where retailers can price discriminate depending on the payment method used and
found that surcharges favor cash over card payments.
3 Experimental design
This Section presents the set-up of the model and the experimental procedures.
The illustration of the theoretical predictions is in Section 4.4 The experiment
has three treatments: Baseline, No-Fee, and Reward (Table 1). Each treatment
reproduces in the laboratory a prototypical retail market with an even number of
homogeneous buyers and sellers, in which frequency of use and acceptability of
different payment methods are endogenous.
In each session, sixteen subjects are randomly divided into two groups: eight
buyers and eight sellers. Subjects interact anonymously and play 40 trading pe-
riods always in the same role. In each period, sellers are monopolists who can
produce a non-storable good for buyers who are endowed with m transaction bal-
ances, called tokens. Sellers and buyers can remain idle or trade goods for tokens.
Tokens have a fixed redemption value, while the value of a good to a buyer (or,
seller) depends on the quantity consumed (or, produced).
A trading period includes six stages:
(1) Payment method choice: everyone independently selects a manual or electronic
4A variety of models has been proposed to study payment methods. For instance, Camera
(2001) studies competition between cash and electronic payments in a random matching model,
Freeman (1996) studies payment systems in an overlapping generations model, and Kahn et
al. (2005) study the problem of transactions’ privacy in a model with spatial separation. The
design we adopt is simple enough to be suitable for a laboratory investigation.
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Treatment
Baseline No-Fee Reward
Parameters
Service fee for electronic payments, 1− ε 0.1 0 0.1
Rebate rate for electronic payments, r 0 0 0.05
Predictions and results
Prices
Theory p∗M ,max p∗E 120, 133 120, 120 120, 133
Data pM , pE 180, 193 203, 190 192, 203
Quantities
Theory q∗M ,min q∗E ,min qˆ∗E 2, 1.62, 1.62 2, 2, 2 2, 1.62, 1.79
Data qM , qME, qE 1.24, .97, .85 1.24, .93, 1.06 1.19, .95, .92
Adoption of manual payments
Sellers (% of choices) 14.4 2.5 6.2
Buyers (% of choices) 55.3 13.0 28.2
Manual settlements (% of all possible) 48.1 11.3 25.1
Sessions (dd/mm/yy)
26/01/12 24/01/12 31/01/12
26/01/12 24/01/12 0 2/02/12
12/03/13 11/03/13 13/03/12
12/03/13 11/03/13 13/03/12
N. participants 64 64 64
Table 1: Overview of the experiment
Notes: The notation is as follows: M = manual, E = electronic. Prices: p∗M = equilibrium
price posted by sellers who only accept manual payments; p∗E = upper bound of equilibrium
price posted by sellers who accept both payments; pM = average observed price posted by
sellers who refused electronic payment; pE = average price posted by sellers who accepted both
payments. Quantities: q∗M = equilibrium demand for manual transactions at price p∗M ; min q∗E =
equilibrium demand for manual transactions at price p∗E ; min qˆ∗E = equilibrium demand for
electronic transactions at price p∗E ; qM = average observed demand for buyers who paid manually
at sellers who refused electronic payments; qME = average observed demand for buyers who paid
manually when seller accepted electronic payments; qE = average observed demand for buyers
who paid electronically. The quantities’ data refer to completed trades and prices are rounded
to the nearest integer. 2012 sessions were conducted at Purdue University and 2013 sessions at
Chapman University.
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means to settle the current trade, i.e., how to transfer tokens from buyer to seller;
(2) Pricing: each seller chooses a unit price p ∈ [0, 400] for the good;
(3) Matching: buyer-seller pairs are randomly formed, according to a strangers
matching protocol;
(4) Demand: each buyer observes the posted price p and demands q ∈ [0, 4] goods;
(5) Payment: buyers complete the trade by transferring no less than pq tokens to
the seller;
(6) Outcome: payoffs are realized.
The Baseline treatment captures two key empirical characteristics of retail
payments. Sellers cannot refuse cash payments. Electronic payments are more
convenient and reliable than cash payments, but are also more costly for sellers.
In the experiment all sellers must accept manual payments and their choice is
whether to also accept electronic payments. Buyers must select either manual or
electronic payment for the period—a design feature that decreases complexity, as
buyers do not have to make an additional portfolio choice. The choice of payment
method is costless and remains private information until the outcome stage.
When everyone has selected a payment method, each seller chooses a price p.
Then, buyer-seller matches are randomly formed with uniform probability among
all possible matches. At this point, each buyer sees the seller’s price and is given
the opportunity to demand a quantity q. Choosing q = 0 amounts to choosing
not to trade. Finally, buyers must pay, after which earnings are realized at the
end of the period. The interaction is local: subjects observe only the outcome in
their pair and have no information about the economy as a whole. Furthermore,
the interaction is anonymous: subjects cannot see the identity of the other person
in their pair (experimental ID), hence there is no scope for reputation formation.
Payoffs. Subjects’ instructions (in Appendix C) described the payoff functions in
tokens, by means of tables and charts reporting tokens’ earnings for given amounts
q ≥ 0 traded.
If there is no trade (q = 0), then the buyer’s payoff corresponds to his transac-
tion balance endowment for the period, m, which is a random integer uniformly
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distributed between 250 and 350 tokens. The seller’s payoff corresponds to a
fixed endowment A = 350, a parameter introduced to minimize differences in cash
payments for subjects with different roles.
If there is trade, then the buyer’s payoff is
m+ u(q)− pq,
where u(q) = 2θ√q is the consumption utility, pq is the expenditure and θ = 169.5.
The seller’s payoff is
A+ q(εp− g)− F, with ε = 0.9.
Net earnings include the gross revenue pq minus production costs and service fees.
Production costs have a fixed component F = 15 and a variable component gq,
with g = 60. If payments are electronic, then the seller pays the merchant service
fee (1− ε)pq, where 1− ε = 0.1 is called the service fee.5
Settling a trade. A trade of quantity q and price p can take place only if the
seller accepts the buyer’s method of payment, and if the buyer has transaction
balances m ≥ pq. A buyer starts the period with m transaction balances in
a manual or an electronic account (depending on the payment method chosen).
Manual payments have an explicit manual component. A buyer’s manual account
displays the transaction balances as a set of tokens of different sizes (1, 5, 10,
or 50-unit tokens) ordered from large to small. Large-size tokens can be broken
down into smaller ones by clicking a button. To pay the amount pq, the buyer
must manually select a suitable combination of tokens with a series of mouse
clicks, and then must execute the payment by clicking a button (see Instructions
in Appendix C). Electronic payments, instead, are executed with a mouse click,
which immediately transfers pq tokens to the seller. Hence, electronic payments
5In field economies, sellers who accept credit or debit cards pay a Merchant Discount Rate or
Merchant Service Fee to the acquirer bank. Service fees range from a few basis points up to 3%
or more, and account for costs for electronic payment processing, settling fees, interchange fees
paid to the issuer, etc. In addition to explicit service fees, there may be implicit costs associated
with tax-avoidance, which is more easily accomplished if payments are made in cash. Given
these considerations, the 10% fee of the design—selected to better differentiate equilibrium
prices across treatments— is therefore not so much unrealistic.
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eliminate execution errors and minimize the effort and time to completion.
To induce differences in reliability and convenience of the two payment meth-
ods, subjects face a trading-time constraint. The entire trade sequence, from
Pricing to Payment (stages 2-5), must be completed within 60 seconds.6 A trad-
ing clock starts after everyone has selected their payment method and trade fails
if payments are not completed in time.
Outcomes. A transaction (or trade) succeeds if the seller accepts the buyer’s
payment method, the trade is executed on time, and with a sufficient transfer of
tokens. Otherwise the trade fails. At the end of each period, in the Outcome
stage, buyer and seller are informed whether trade succeeded or failed. In the
first case, they see the quantity traded, the earnings, and the payment method
selected by their counterpart. Otherwise, they are informed about the reason for
the failure. At each point in time, subjects can see their own trading history in
the session. These rules and parameters are common knowledge.
Other treatments. Compared to the Baseline treatment, in the No-Fee treat-
ment the sellers’ service fee is set to zero, so ε = 1 in the seller’s payoff function.
In the Reward treatment, instead, half of the seller’s service fee is rebated to the
buyer, so the buyer’s payoff is
m+ u(q)− pq(1− r), where r = 1− ε2 .
We recruited 192 subjects through announcements in undergraduate classes, half
at Purdue University and half at Chapman University (Table 1). The experiment
was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Instructions (see Appendix C) were read aloud at the start of the experiment
and left on the subjects’ desks. No eye contact was possible among subjects.
Average earnings were $22 per subject.7 On average, a session lasted about 2
6To familiarize subjects with the experiment, in periods 1-6 the time constraint was 120 seconds
and the payment method was exogenously imposed (electronic in periods 1-3, and manual in
periods 4-6).
7The show up fee was $5 for all treatments at Purdue (at Chapman, $7 for No-Fee and $14 for
Baseline and Reward) and the conversion rate was 7 cents for every 100 tokens at Purdue (at
Chapman, $0.12 for No-Fee and $0.07 for the other treatments). Following local lab standards,
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hours, including instruction reading and a quiz.
4 Theoretical predictions
This section studies the symmetric Nash equilibria of the game described in the
previous section. To do so, we move backwards, starting with the derivation of
the optimal demand schedule in a trade match, given a price p and rebate rate
r. Then, we study the optimal price posted by sellers given a service fee 1 − .
Finally, given optimal pricing and demand schedules, the optimal payment method
adoption strategy is studied.
Let µi ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability that player i = b, s (b =buyer, s =seller)
selects manual payments. Hence, µs is the probability that a seller only accepts
manual payments, 1 − µs is the probability that a seller also accepts electronic
payments, while 1 − µb and µb are, respectively, the probabilities that a buyer
pays electronically and manually. The following definitions will be helpful in what
follows:
• Acceptability of electronic payments is the probability that a seller accepts
an electronic payment, 1− µs. Manual payments are always accepted.
• The reliability of a payment method is the probability of a successful trade
conditional on the given payment method being accepted by the seller. In the
experiment, reliability is endogenous. The (absolute) reliability of electronic
payments is denoted Re and the (absolute) reliability of manual payments is
denoted Rm. Let σ := Rm/Re be the relative reliability of manual payments.
• Trade risk for a buyer is the probability of failing to trade with a given
payment method because of acceptability or reliability problems. The trade
risk of electronic payments is µs+(1−Re)(1−µs). The trade risk of manual
payments is 1−Rm.
• Trade frictions in the economy are the expected share of failed trades out
of all possible trades, i.e., the expected failure rate of electronic transac-
Chapman students were paid more.
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tions (due to mismatch and reliability problems) and of manual transactions
(due to reliability problems). Normalizing trade frictions by the reliability
of electronic transactions when Re is close to one, trade frictions are approx-
imately8
τ := (1− µb)µs + (1− σ)µb.
In the experimental data Re is close to one, but Rm is not. Hence, theoretical
predictions can be derived considering electronic transactions as being approxi-
mately always reliable, implying that σ approximates the reliability of manual
payments, while 1−σ and µs approximate the trade risk of manual and electronic
payments.
4.1 Prices and quantities
Optimal demand is characterized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Optimal demand). Given a price p and a rebate parameter r, the
optimal demand of an unconstrained buyer satisfies
q(p; r) :=
(
θ
p
)2
× 1(1− r)2 ,
while a constrained buyer demands m/p.
Proof. See Appendix A.
If the buyer’s transaction balances are insufficient to satisfy her demand, m <
p × q(p; r), then the optimal quantity demanded is simply m/p. Otherwise, if
the buyer is unconstrained, she optimally demands q(p; r) goods. This quantity
decreases with the price p and increases with the rebate rate r.
The model is parameterized so that in equilibrium demand is always inte-
rior (Appendix A). The quantity demanded is unaffected by the seller’s payment
8The expected share of failed trades out of all possible trades is
τ∗ := (1− µb)µs + (1−Re)(1− µb)(1− µs) + (1−Rm)µb,
i.e., the expected failure rate of electronic transactions (first two terms, capturing mismatch
and reliability problems) plus that of manual transactions (third term). Normalized trade
frictions are τ = τ∗Re . For Re ≈ 1—as in the experimental data (see later)—we have τ ≈
(1− µb)µs + µb(1− σ), where σ = RmRe .
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method because sellers cannot price-discriminate. It depends on the buyer’s pay-
ment method if there are rewards from electronic payments. The quantity traded,
instead, depends on the payments methods of both parties.
To derive the optimal pricing schedule, recall that sellers are monopolists with
linear preferences over tokens. They choose a price p to maximize expected prof-
its. A trade succeeds only if the seller accepts the buyer’s payment method and,
conditional on that, if the trade can be executed on time.
Lemma 2 (Optimal posted price). Consider the treatment parameters (ε, r)
and the endogenous probabilities (µb, σ). The profit-maximizing prices for a seller
who, respectively, refuses and accepts electronic payments are
pM := 2g and pE := pM × µbσ(1− r)
2 + (1− µb)
µbσ(1− r)2 + (1− µb)ε.
Proof. See Appendix A.
A seller who does not anticipate receiving electronic payments posts a price
pM , which is below the price pE posted if some electronic payments are expected,
where
pM ≤ pE ≤ pM
ε
,
Sellers who expect some electronic payments charge premium prices to recoup
the expected service fees. The premium depends on the anticipated incidence of
electronic transactions, and therefore is bounded above (approximately) by the
service fee 1− ε; it falls in µb and converges to zero as µb → 1.9
To summarize, the design ensures that if sellers pay a service fee to receive elec-
tronic payments (Baseline), then they charge premium prices, where the premium
is roughly equal to the service fee 1−ε. If buyers earn rewards from electronic pur-
chases (Reward), then they increase their demand by a percentage roughly equal
to the service fee. If electronic payments have neither costs nor benefits (No-Fee),
then prices and quantities are independent of the payment method adopted.
9Due to the fixed cost F , sellers trade only if their expected profit is non-negative. The design
parameters ensure that equilibrium profits are positive, i.e., F is below net earnings q(p; r)(εp−
g) and q(p)(p− g). See Appendix A.
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4.2 Payment methods’ adoption
Given optimal prices and quantities, we determine the choice of payment methods
in symmetric Nash equilibrium. In doing so, we differentiate use from adoption
of a payment method. Use refers to the payment method utilized in a successful
trade. Adoption refers to the individual choice of payment method.
Using Lemma 1, let q(p) := q(p; 0) when r = 0, hence let qE := q(pE) and qM =
q(pM) denote the (optimal) quantity demanded by a buyer who pays manually and
faces, respectively, prices pE and pM . In contrast, let
qˆE :=
q(pE)
(1− r)2
denote the quantity demanded by a buyer who pays electronically; clearly, the
buyer cannot trade with sellers posting pM , because they only accept manual
payments. Using a linear approximation around ε = 1, observe that qˆE/qE ≈ 1−ε
when ε is small. To summarize, all else equal, buyers demand an identical quantity
unless rewards are given for electronic payments; in that case, buyers who have
selected electronic payments demand more than other buyers.
Let µi denote the probability that any player i selects manual payments in
symmetric Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium payoff Vbj to a buyer who pays
using method j = E,M and has m transaction balances is
VbE = m+ (1− µs)[u(qˆE)− pE(1− r)qˆE],
VbM = m+ σ {(1− µs) [u(qE)− pEqE)] + µs [u(qM)− pMqM ]}.
(1)
Sellers who, respectively, accept and refuse electronic payments have payoffs
VsE = A+ µbσ[qE(pE − g)− F ] + (1− µb)[qˆE(εpE − g)− F ],
VsM = A+ µbσ[qM(pM − g)− F ].
The payoff-maximizing choice of payments method µ′j for player j = b, s satisfies
µ′j =

1 if VjM − VjE > 0
[0, 1] if VjM − VjE = 0
0 if VjM − VjE < 0.
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Traders evaluate the expected relative benefits of paying manually and electroni-
cally. Everyone benefits from the greater reliability of electronic payments. How-
ever, buyers and sellers face different incentives. For buyers, electronic payments
generate rewards but may also carry the risk of being declined. The opposite is
true for sellers; accepting electronic payments resolves coordination problems in
payment methods, but using them may generate costs. This generates coordina-
tion problems.
Proposition 1 (Equilibria). Let prices and quantities satisfy Lemmas 1-2. Ev-
ery treatment supports two symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria characterized
by homogeneous adoption of a single payment method.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The design ensures that in all treatments two Nash equilibria coexist, which
are characterized by the uniform adoption of one payment method. The two pure
strategy equilibria µj = 0, 1 for j = b, s coexist in each treatment (Table 1).10
These equilibria always coexist because payment method choices are strategic
complements. If sellers refuse electronic payments, then a buyer’s dominant action
is to pay manually, hence µb = µs = 0. If every seller accepts both payment
methods, then buyers prefer electronic payments when these generate rewards
or are more reliable; otherwise, buyers are indifferent. Hence, µb = µs = 1 is
always a symmetric equilibrium. It follows that, in each treatment, subjects face
a coordination problem, which by design cannot be solved through communication.
Note that payment methods’ adoption choices have implications for the level
of trade frictions τ in the economy. Although manual payments are less reliable
than electronic, buyers’ adoption of manual payments is not necessarily a source of
trade frictions. In fact, an increase in buyers’ frequency of adoption of electronic
payments reduces trade frictions τ only when electronic payments have a lower
relative trading risk, µs < 1 − σ. Therefore, this design ensures an endogenous
association between relative diffusion of electronic payments and trade frictions.
10Appendix A reports the complete set of symmetric equilibria. In particular, there exists
a symmetric equilibrium in which sellers mix, while buyers adopt manual payments. This
equilibrium is not robust to trembles as it introduces mismatch risk; hence, sellers have an
incentive to accept both payments since there is no cost from doing so.
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This, and the pricing associated with different adoption modes, has implications
for efficiency, as we explain next.
4.3 Efficiency
The economy may exhibit inefficiencies because of pricing distortions, which lead
to inefficient quantities, and because of frictions due to failed transactions.
Consider the first inefficiency, which is along the intensive margin. Let q∗
satisfy u′(q∗) = g, where q∗ :=
(
θ
g
)2
. From Lemmas 1-2, the quantities traded in
each of the two pure strategy equilibria are
q =
 qM = q
∗/4 if µb = µs = 1,
qˆE = (q∗/4)×
(
ε
1−r
)2
< qM if µb = µs = 0.
Traded quantities are inefficiently low when all transactions involve costly elec-
tronic payments because service fees amount to a distortionary tax. Minimum
equilibrium consumption occurs when buyers earn no rewards, r = 0. It follows
that trade surplus is the lowest when costly electronic payments are adopted,
because
u(qˆE)− gqˆE = 3θ
2
4g ×
ε
1− r
[
1− ε4(1− r)
]
− F
<
3θ2
4g − F = u(qM)− gqM .
(2)
Now consider the extensive margin inefficiency. We measure aggregate effi-
ciency by ex-ante social welfare W , defined as the sum of payoffs to buyer and
seller, net of fixed payments, plus un-rebated service fees, i.e.,
W := ∑
i=b,s
[µiV iM + (1− µi)V iE] + (1− µb)(1− µs)pEq(pE; r)(1− ε− r)− (A+m),
Here, service fees are not a deadweight loss because they either compensate buyers
(rewards) or some unmodeled service providers. In the expression W service fees
are net of rewards, pEq(pE; r)(1− ε− r), and are multiplied by (1− µb)(1− µs),
which is the expected frequency of electronic purchases. Substituting for V iE,V iM
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we obtain
W = (1− µb)(1− µs)[u(qˆE)− gqˆE − F ] + µb(1− µs)σ[u(qE)− gqE − F ]
+ µbµsσ[u(qM)− gqM − F ].
(3)
The expression above indicates that a planner would impose the uniform adoption
of the highest-return payment method to avoid mismatch in payment preferences,
and note that
W =
 WM := σ[u(qM)− gqM − F ] if µb = µs = 1,WE := u(qˆE)− gqˆE − F if µb = µs = 0.
What payment system would the planner adopt, then?
Proposition 2 (Efficiency). Let prices and quantities satisfy Lemmas 1-2. If
the relative reliability of manual payments is
σ ≤ σ∗ := u(qˆE)− gqˆE − F
u(qM)− gqM − F ,
then social welfare W is maximized by common adoption of electronic payments.
To prove it, note that manual trades are associated with the greatest trading
efficiency, qˆE ≤ qM , but are unreliable—trade succeeds only with probability σ.
The planner selects electronic payments ifWM ≤ WE, i.e., when manual payments
are sufficiently unreliable. This occurs if σ ≤ σ∗ where σ∗ < 1 whenever ε < 1;
see (2). Given the design parameters we have σ∗ = .93 in Baseline and σ∗ = .96
in Reward. It is immediate that σ∗ = 1 in No-Fee since quantities are indepen-
dent of payment method used; coordinating on the use of electronic payments is
always optimal in this treatment since there are no price distortions. For the other
treatments, it depends on the realized value of σ.
5 Results
This section focuses on two questions: did our experimental markets succeed in
coordinating on using a common payment method? And how did service fees and
rewards associated with electronic payments alter trade patterns and efficiency?
We report four main results. Results 1-3 concern the diffusion of the payment
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methods. Result 4 reports the relationship between payment methods and trade
frictions and efficiency.
All analyses exclude the initial six periods, where, in order to familiarize par-
ticipants with the task, only one payment method was made available. Recall that
use refers to the payment method observed in a transaction successfully completed
and adoption refers to the individual choice of payment method.
Result 1 (Use of payment methods). There was mixed use of payment methods
in the Baseline treatment. The use of electronic payments prevailed in the No-Fee
and Reward treatments.
Tables 1 and 2 provide support for Result 1. Among all trades that are success-
fully completed, 51.4 percent were settled with an electronic payment in Baseline,
74.9 in Reward and 88.7 in No-Fee (Table 1). A Wilcoxon rank-sum test re-
veals that both the difference between Baseline and No-Fee and between Baseline
and Reward are significant (p = 0.021 and p = 0.083 respectively, two-sided,
N1 = N2 = 4). Further support is provided by a probit regression, where the
dependent variable is the use of payment methods and takes value 1 for electronic
trades and 0 for manual trades (Table 2, Model 1). The econometric analysis shows
that introducing rewards for buyers or eliminating sellers’ service fees significantly
raised overall use of electronic payments.
Recall that in all treatments the equilibrium where everybody trades manually
coexists with the one where all trades are electronic. A possible interpretation of
Result 1 is that the cost associated with electronic payments serves as a coordi-
nation device for payment methods’ selection.
To shed further light on Result 1, we separately study the adoption choices of
sellers and buyers.
Result 2 (Adoption choices). In all treatments, sellers were more likely to
adopt electronic payments than buyers.
Figure 1 shows adoption rates by type of trader. Pooling all treatments, sellers
chose electronic payments in 92 percent of cases, while buyers adopted electronic
payments in 68 percent of instances; such difference is significant according to a
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Dependent variable: Buyers who traded All buyers & sellers
Payment method selected (use) (adoption)
(1=electronic, 0=manual) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
No-Fee treatment 2.831 *** 1.677 ***
(0.473) (0.261)
Reward treatment 1.507 *** 0.721 ***
(0.469) (0.246)
Buyer role -1.367 *** -1.346 ***
(0.229) (0.208)
Period 0.025 *** 0.029 *** 0.029 ***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Purdue location -0.599 -0.571 ** -0.553 ***
(0.375) (0.228) (0.207)
Constant -0.650 * 1.858 *** 1.024 ***
(0.393) (0.210) (0.240)
N.obs. 2986 6528 6528
N.subjects 96 192 192
Log likelihood -904.833 -1717.309 -1698.241
Table 2: Use and adoption of electronic payments
Notes: Probit regression with individual random effects. The dependent variable takes value 1 if
electronic payments are choosen and 0 otherwise. Model 1 considers only buyers who successfully
traded. In Models 2 and 3, we pool adoption choices of both sellers and buyers. The default
treatment is Baseline. The explanatory variable Buyer role equals 1 for a buyer and 0 for a
seller, while the dummy Purdue assumes value 1 for sessions carried out at Purdue University
and 0 for sessions at Chapman University. Periods 7-40 only. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p < 0.001, two-sided, NB = NS = 12). This significance
is confirmed by a probit regression, where the dependent variable is the payment
method adopted by a trader (Table 2, Model 2). The disparities in adoption rates
between buyers and sellers remain significant even after controlling for treatment
effects (Table 2, Model 3); Buyers were significantly more reluctant to adopt elec-
tronic payments than sellers (p= 0.043, p=0.020, p=0.021 in Baseline, No-Fee,
and Reward, respectively; two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum, NB = NS = 4).
Introducing buyers’ rewards from electronic purchases or eliminating sellers’
service fees boosts the diffusion of electronic payments primarily because it alters
buyers’ behavior. On average, 45 percent of buyers chose electronic payments in
Baseline, a rate that increased to 72 percent if rewards were added and to 87
percent if fees were removed. The increases relative to Baseline are significant
(p=0.021 and p=0.083 for No-Fee vs. Baseline and Reward vs. Baseline, respec-
tively; two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum, N1 = N2 = 4). In contrast, sellers’ adoption
choices did not significantly change across treatments. Average adoption rates of
electronic payments for sellers were 86, 94 and 98 percent in Baseline, Reward, and
No-Fee. The only significant difference is between No-Fee and Reward (p=0.042,
two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum, NNF = NR = 4). This is interesting because it
implies that monetary costs and benefits from using electronic payments cannot
entirely explain adoption choices in the experiment.
Result 3 (Buyers’ adoption choices). A group of buyers consistently adopted
manual payments when service fees were present. This behavior was no longer
observed when service fees were removed or rewards added; a group of consistent
users of electronic payments emerged, instead.
Table 3 provides support for Result 3. Buyers who always adopted manual
payments were 22 percent in Baseline and none in the other treatments. There
also exists a group of buyers who regularly adopted electronic payments; this group
grew from 6 to 44 percent when the service fee was removed. Most buyers were
occasional users who switched payment systems. The switching probability sig-
nificantly declined with experience and increased whenever a buyer experienced a
trade failure. It made no difference whether the failed trade involved an electronic
19
(a) Sellers
(b) Buyers
Figure 1: Adoption of payment methods
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Treatment
Fraction of buyers Baseline No-Fee Reward
Regular users
Manual payment 0.22 0.00 0.00
Electronic payment 0.06 0.44 0.22
Occasional users
1 or 2 switches 0.13 0.25 0.16
3 or more switches 0.59 0.31 0.63
Table 3: Buyers’ adoption of payment methods
or manual attempt to pay.11 Such disparities in adoption choices contributed to
generate endogenous trade frictions and inefficiencies, as discussed below.
Result 4 (Trade frictions and efficiency). There is a positive association
between trade frictions, efficiency losses and buyers’ adoption of manual payments.
Tables 4-5 provide support for Result 4. Trade frictions are measured as the fre-
quency of failed transaction in the economy (see Section 4). Frictions endogenously
emerged in every treatment and were positively associated with the diffusion of
manual payments in the experimental retail markets. The highest incidence of
trade frictions is found in Baseline, followed by Reward, and No-Fee (Jonckheere-
Terpstra test; p-value= 0.012, N=12, two-sided). Tobit regressions show a posi-
tive, significant association between trade frictions and buyers’ adoption of manual
payments also after controlling for treatments effects (Table 4).
Buyers were pivotal in determining the diffusion of payment methods in our
experimental retail markets, and trade frictions largely depended on their adoption
choices. The data allow us to separately measure trade frictions that are due to
reliability problems and to acceptability problems (Table 5). Buyers who adopted
manual payments were exposed to trade risk that was entirely due to reliability
issues because by design manual payments were always accepted. On the other
hand, buyers who adopted electronic payments, were primarily exposed to trade
risk due to acceptability issues because electronic payments were very reliable.
11Evidence comes from a probit regression on individual changes in payment methods (Table B-1
in Appendix B), where we controlled for buyers’ types according to their prevalent adoption
of payment methods, electronic or manual.
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Dependent variable:
Fraction of buyers who
adopted manual payments Model 1 Model 2
Trade frictions 0.257 *** 0.253 ***
(0.064) (0.063)
No-Fee treatment -0.436 ***
(0.089)
Reward treatment -0.273 ***
(0.089)
Purdue location 0.135 *
(0.073)
Constant 0.288 *** 0.457 ***
(0.067) (0.073)
N.obs. 408 408
Log. Likelihood 151.347 158.555
Table 4: Buyers’ adoption of manual payments
Notes: Tobit regressions with session random effects, censored at 0. The dependent variable
is the fraction of buyers who chose manual payments in each period of each treatment. The
unit of observation is the period average within a session. Trade frictions are per-period session
averages. Symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
In the experiment, reliability and acceptability of payment methods were en-
dogenous. Manual payments had about 85 percent reliability, which means that a
buyer who intended to pay manually faced a 15 percent probability of being unable
to complete the trade. In contrast, electronic payments were very reliable (97-98
percent) but their acceptability varied between 86 and 98 percent, depending on
the treatment.12 As a result , buyers who adopted electronic payments faced a
trade risk that was between 3.9 and 10.5 percent.
Overall, the two payment methods exhibited similar trade risk in Baseline,
while electronic payments minimized trade risk when service fees were removed or
buyers’ rewards added. This suggests that relative trade risk considerations could
well be the driving force behind buyers’ adoption of payment methods.
Trade frictions, together with price and quantity distortions gave rise to sub-
stantial inefficiencies. Table 6 reports theoretical and realized efficiency measures.
12The data reveal that manual trades failed primarily due to time constraints and not underpay-
ment, while the reverse is true for electronic trades, which primarily failed due to underpayment
and not time constraints (see also Table B-2 in Appendix B).
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Treatment
Baseline No-Fee Reward
Trade frictions τ .114 .051 .091
Buyers’ choice of manual payments
Fraction of choices µb .553 .130 .282
Trade risk .103 .154 .127
Reliability Rm .869 .846 .873
Acceptability 1 1 1
Buyers’ choice of electronic payments
Fraction of choices 1− µb .447 .870 .718
Trade risk .105 .039 .083
Reliability Re .973 .985 .977
Acceptability .859 .976 .935
Performance of manual relative to electronic payments
Relative reliability σ .893 .859 .893
Relative acceptability 1.2 1.0 1.1
Table 5: Endogenous trade frictions: acceptability, reliability, and trade risk
Notes: Average incidence of trade failures unconditional and conditional on the buyer’s pay-
ment. Trade frictions are the incidence of failed trades as a percentage of all possible trades.
Trade risk for a buyer using payment method i = E,M is the incidence of trade failures either
due to reliability or acceptability by the seller. Reliability is the percentage of successful trades,
conditional on the payment method being accepted. Acceptability is the percentage of times the
buyer’s payment method is accepted by the seller. Reliability and acceptability measures are an
average of session averages. All numbers are rounded up to the closest decimal point.
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The highest theoretical efficiency level is W = 344.13 (Equation 3) but it cannot
be achieved in every treatment. It can be achieved either when everyone adopts
manual payments that are fully reliable (µb = µs = 1 and σ = 1), or when every-
one adopts electronic payments that carry no costs for sellers (µb = µs = 0 and
 = 1). We use this upper bound to normalize all values in Table 5 so that our
efficiency measure are reported as a fraction of the highest theoretical value.
Table 6 reports the theoretical efficiency for a treatment as the highest (normal-
ized) valueW that is feasible in that treatment.13 According to Proposition 2, the
highest feasible value implies uniform adoption of electronic payments, because in
the experiment they were sufficiently more reliable than manual payments, σ < σ∗
(Table 5). Differences in theoretical efficiency across treatments were due to price
and quantity distortions from service-fees and rewards (Lemma 1 and 2).
Realized efficiency is the (normalized) value W observed in the experiment.
Treatment
Normalized efficiency W Baseline No-Fee Reward
Theoretical 0.93 1.00 0.96
Realized 0.59 0.69 0.62
Breakdown of efficiency losses
a. Sub-optimal adoption 19.7% 11.5% 19.8%
b. Sub-optimal prices 37.2% 68.5% 46.8%
c. Sub-optimal consumption 43.1% 20.0% 29.7%
Table 6: Measures of aggregate efficiency
The ordering of treatments in terms of their theoretical efficiency corresponds
to their ordering in terms of realized efficiency. In all treatments there are efficiency
losses, which range from .31 to .34 of the highest possible efficiency. These losses
originate from three sources: (a) sub-optimal adoption of payment methods; (b)
price departures from theoretical predictions; (c) quantities traded that differ from
theoretical predictions.
The greatest source of inefficiency is associated with quantities and prices that
departed from equilibrium. Average prices movements across treatments are con-
13For instance, in the Baseline treatment the theoretical highest value is W = 320.04, which is
based on p∗e = 133 and q∗e = 1.62. This value is then normalized, dividing it by 344.13.
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sistent with the theoretical comparative statics. In particular, the mean price
posted by sellers who did not accept electronic payments was similar across treat-
ments; in the Baseline treatment this price was significantly below the mean
price of sellers who accepted electronic payments. However, in the remaining
treatments, prices were not significantly affected by the seller’s payment method
choice.14 Average price levels, instead, were higher than theoretical equilibrium
predictions (Table 1) and such pricing distortion was responsible for a significant
efficiency loss because average quantities traded were below the theoretical equi-
librium quantities.
All treatments had some inefficiency resulting from mis-coordination in pay-
ment method adoption. Yet, the inefficient adoption of payment methods ac-
counted for twice as much efficiency loss in the Baseline and Reward treatments
compared to the No-Fee treatment, where there was the highest adoption of elec-
tronic payments.
6 Discussion and conclusions
This study provides a novel experimental framework to advance research and to
inform policies about payment methods adoption. Experiments have the poten-
tial to address a vast array of issues in retail payments for several reasons. In the
lab, one can construct model economies where agents have perfect information
about the institutions under study. Unlike in the field, one can also manipulate
exogenously the variables of interest, hence establishing the relationship between
payment systems’ attributes—such as service fees or reward programs—and their
diffusion in the economy. Finally, the possibility to combine data on usage and
costs of payment systems, as well as the ability to precisely test theoretical predic-
tions, makes experiments a useful tool to advance the literature on retail payments.
In this study we have first developed a simple and flexible laboratory test-
bed that captures some basic features of retail electronic payments. Then, using
well-established tools from experimental economics, we have investigated the in-
14Statistical evidence is reported in Appendix B, see Table B-3.
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dividual payment method’s adoption decisions of consumers and retailers who are
motivated by actual incentives. In this manner, this paper complements existing
survey-based studies about consumers and retailers’ adoption decisions.
Our aim is to shed light on the association between features of the economy
and individual payment method’s adoption choices on one hand, and endogenous
trading frictions and social efficiency on the other hand. To achieve this goal we
study economies where there always exist an equilibrium in which every trade is
executed using manual payments, and another in which electronic payments are
always used. Coordinating on using electronic payments guarantees the greatest
social welfare. The design captures empirically-relevant features of retail markets
and, in particular, that buyers and sellers face different incentives. For buyers,
electronic payments generate benefits but may carry the risk of being declined.
The opposite is true for sellers; accepting electronic payments reduces the risk of
trade failures but using electronic payments generates costs.
The experiment comprises three treatments: Baseline, No-Fee, and Reward.
In the Baseline treatment, sellers suffer a cost from executing an electronic trans-
action, which is proportional to the revenue. Service fee are removed in No-Fee,
while buyers’ rewards are introduced in Reward. There are two main lessons.
First, analysis of the data suggests that buyers are pivotal in the diffusion of
electronic payments. Sellers readily adopted electronic payments in all treatments,
and did so significantly more than buyers. This is particularly interesting given
that in our set-up only sellers suffered electronic payments’ usage costs, and could
not price-discriminate based on the buyer’s choice of payment method. When
sellers had to pay a service fee, a sizeable group of buyers regularly adopted manual
payments. This behavior was no longer observed when service fees were removed
or rewards added; under these conditions, a new group of buyers emerged, which
regularly adopted electronic payments.
Second, the data suggest that regulatory policies aimed at fostering competi-
tion among providers or at increasing reward programs could boost the diffusion of
electronic payments among consumers in retail markets. The experimental data
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collected allows us to measure the endogenous extent of trade frictions, to pin
down their source, and to assess their impact in terms of efficiency loss for the
entire market. We find that trade frictions, together with price and quantity dis-
tortions, gave rise to substantial inefficiencies. Interestingly, inefficient diffusion
of payment methods accounted for twice as much efficiency loss in Baseline and
Reward, compared to the No-Fee treatment, where there was the highest adoption
of electronic payments.
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Appendix A: Theory
Proof of Lemma 1
Consider an economy with a population composed of equal numbers of anonymous,
homogeneous sellers and buyers. We use M to denote manual as opposed to
electronic payments, denoted E.
At the beginning of the period the buyer receives a random amount of tokens
m ∈ [mL,mH ], with uniform pdf. These transaction balances can either be spent
to purchase goods or simply consumed. Buyers have quasilinear preferences de-
fined over transaction balances and goods. If we normalize the price of tokens to
one (the numeraire), then the utility (in tokens) of a buyer who has m transaction
balances and purchases q > 0 goods at price p > 0 is
m+ u(q)− pq(1− r).
Here u(q) is the utility from consuming q gods, with u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, and u(0) = 0.
The expenditure is pq and r denotes a possible reward rate to the buyer, which can
be positive or zero. The reward is earned after the purchase has been executed—it
takes the form of a rebate—and so it is simply “consumed;” the reward cannot be
used to relax the expenditure constraint, i.e., we have pq ≤ m.
The buyer chooses q ≥ 0 to solve the problem
max[m+ u(q)− pq(1− r) + λ(m− pq)]
where λ is the Ku¨hn-Tucker multiplier on the expenditure constraint. The first
order condition is
u′(q)− p(1− r)− λp ≤ 0.
We can thus define the buyer’s inverse demand function by
0 if u′(0) ≤ p(1− r),
q(p(1− r)) := (u′)−1(p(1− r)) if u′(0) > p(1− r) and pq ≤ m,
m
p
otherwise .
(4)
Demand depends on the price p posted by the seller, the transaction balances m,
and the rebate rate r, which may be zero or positive, depending on the treatment.
The demand does not directly depend on the payment method because the seller
cannot price-discriminate based on the payment method selected, and neither
payment method generates a cost to the buyer. If demand is positive, then u(q)−
pq(1− r) > 0.
We parameterize the model such that the decomposition q(p(1−r)) = k(r)q(p) ≥
q(p) holds, where k(0) = 1, k′(r) > 0, and q′(p) < 0 < q′′(p). When r = 0 we have
1
q(p(1− r)) = q(p). In the experiment we assume u(q) = 2θ√q, which implies
q(p) =
(
θ
p
)2
,
q(p(1− r)) = k(r)q(p) = q(p)(1− r)2 ,
∂q(p(1− r))
∂p
= q′(p)k(r) = −2q(p)
p
k(r) < 0.
That is, for a buyer who encounters a seller posting a price p, q(p) is quantity
purchased if the buyer pays manually, and q(p(1 − r)) is quantity purchased if
the buyer pays electronically and there is a proportional rebate r on electronic
purchases. 2
Proof of Lemma 2
Each seller is a monopolist who has linear preferences over tokens and chooses the
price p to maximize expected profits, given expected demand. If q = q(p(1 − r))
for all m ∈ [mL,mH ], then expected demand is simply q(p(1− r)). We will work
under this conjecture because, under the parametrization selected, this is true in
equilibrium (see Supplementary Materials).
A seller who accepts electronic payments must accept also manual payments,
and cannot price discriminate. Given that the buyer demands q goods when the
price is p and the rebate rate is r, the transaction can be completed only if the
seller accepts the buyer’s chosen payment method, and if the buyer transfers at
least pq tokens to the seller. We presume that manual transactions are settled
with probability σ. If a transaction cannot be settled, then the seller produces
nothing.
The expected profit VsE(p) of a seller who accepts electronic payments and
posts price p is thus
VsE(p) := A+ µbσ[q(p)(p− g)− F ] + (1− µb)[k(r)q(p)(εp− g)− F ],
where µb denotes the (endogenous) probability that the buyer encountered uses
manual payments and we have used the fact that q(p(1− r)) = k(r)q(p).
The seller always receives the fixed payment A, and may have earnings from
trading with the buyer. With probability 1 − µb the seller meets a buyer who
uses electronic payments; here, demand is k(r)q(p), so the seller’s profits are
k(r)q(p)(εp−g)−F. With probability µb the seller meets a buyer who uses manual
payments, in which case demand is q(p), and expected profits are σq(p)(p−g)−F.
The FOC for an interior solution is
µbσ[q′(p)(p− g) + q(p)] + (1− µb)k(r)[q′(p)(εp− g) + εq(p)] = 0.
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Define
η0 := µbσ + (1− µb)k(r)ε and η1 := µbσ + (1− µb)k(r). (5)
Let pE be the profit-maximizing price for a seller who accepts electronic payments;
pE > 0 uniquely solves
q′(p) (pη0 − gη1) + q(p)η0 = 0,
so we have the identity
pE =
gη1
η0
− q(pE)
q′(pE)
where pE > g since η0 < η1 and q′ < 0.
A seller who does not accept electronic payments trades with probability µbσ,
i.e., when she meets a buyer who has adopted a manual payment method. The
expected profit is
VsM(p) := A+ µbσ[q(p)(p− g)− F ].
The profit-maximizing price pM uniquely satisfies Q′(p)(p− g) +Q(p) = 0, so we
have the identity
pM = g − q(pM)
q′(pM)
.
Hence, pM is independent of µb, pM ≤ pE, and pE = pM only if µb = 1 or ε = 1
(which is when η1 = η0)
Given the functional forms for optimal demand in (4) we have
pM := 2g and pE := pM
η1
η0
. (6)
It should be clear that pM ≤ pE ≤ pM
ε
because η1
η0
falls in µb, equalling 1 when
µb = 1 and
1
ε
when µb = 0. Note that pM is invariant to µb while
∂pE
∂µb
∝
σk(r)(1− ε) < 0.
Due to the fixed cost F , sellers trade only if their expected profit is non-
negative for any choice of payment selected by the buyer. We choose parameters
so that sellers are never inactive, i.e., F is below then net earnings q(p)(εp − g)
and q(p)(p− g). To do so, we need to ensure that
F < q(pE)(εpE − g)
in which case F < q(pM)(pM − g). To see this, note that p = pM is the unique
maximizer of q(p)(p − g); it follows that q(pM)(pM − g) > q(pE)(pE − g) for all
pM < pE.We have q(pE)(pE − g) > q(pE)(εpE − g). So, if q(pE)(εpE − g)−F > 0,
then q(pM)(pM−g)−F > 0; notice also that this implies k(r)q(pE)(εpE−g)−F > 0
since k(r) > 0. For the parameters used in the experiment F < q(pE)(εpE − g)
holds in all symmetric equilibria (see Supplementary Materials). 2
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No-Fee Baseline Reward
µs = 0 x 1 0 x 1 0 x 1
0 X X X
µb = y X− X−
1 X− X−− X X−− X X−− X
Table A-1: Multiplicity of equilibria
Notes: The Table reports all the possible symmetric equilibria. − indicates that the equilibrium
exists only if σ = 1 (manual and electronic payments are equally reliable). −− indicates that
the equilibrium is not robust to trembles in buyers’ choice. We let y = (0, 1), i.e., any number
in the open unit interval, and x = (1− σ(1− r), 1).
Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 is a special case of proposition A-1 which we next present and prove.
Proposition A-1. Let prices and quantities satisfy Lemmas 1-2. Each treatment
supports multiple symmetric Nash equilibria:
(µb, µs) =

(0, 0), (y, 0)?, (1, 0)?, (1, x), (1, 1) if (ε, r) = (1, 0);
(0, 0), (y, 0)?, (1, x), (1, 1) if (ε, r) = (.9, 0);
(0, 0), (1, x), (1, 1) if (ε, r) = (.9, .05),
for y = (0, 1), and x = (1− σ(1− r), 1). The notation ? indicates the equilibrium
exists only if σ = 1.
Table A-1 summarizes the possible equilibria, by treatment.
Consider a symmetric stationary outcome. Let µi ∈ [0, 1] denote the proba-
bility that a player of type i = b, s (b =buyer, s =seller) has adopted the manual
payment method. Hence, 1− µs is the probability that a seller accepts both elec-
tronic and manual payments, while 1−µb is the probability that a buyer uses the
electronic payment method.
A buyer who adopts electronic payments can only make a purchase if the seller
accepts electronic payments. A buyer who adopts manual payments can buy from
any seller.
Conjecturing that the buyer is unconstrained in his purchases. Let
qˆE = q(pE(1− r))
denote the equilibrium quantity demanded when the price is pE and the rebate
rate is r. There is never a reward for a buyer who trades using manual payments,
so we let qE = q(pE) and qM = q(pM) denote the equilibrium quantity demanded,
when the price is pE and pM , respectively, and the buyer pays manually.
The payoff Bj to a buyer who has adopted payment method j = M,E and has
m transaction balances is thus
VbM = m+ σ {(1− µs) [u(qE)− pEqE)] + µs [u(qM)− pMqM ]} ,
VbE = m+ (1− µs)[u(qˆE)− pE(1− r)qˆE].
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Here qj satisfies (4), pj satisfy (6) and σ ∈ (0, 1] denotes the probability that a
manual payments is completed in the time allocated to transact. It follows that
VbM − VbE = µsσ[u(qM)− pMqM ]− (1− µs)[u(qE)− pEqE]
( 1
1− r − σ
)
.
The second term in the equality above follows from qˆE = k(r)q(pE) = q(pE)(1−r)2 so we
have u(qˆE) = u(qE) 11−r since u(q) =
√
q.
The choice of payment method µ′b of the generic buyer must satisfy:
µ′b =

1 if VbM − VbE > 0,
[0, 1] if VbM − VbE = 0,
0 if VbM − VbE = 0.
(7)
The buyer evaluates the difference between the expected surplus earned when
sellers accept only manual payments µsσ[u(qM)−pMqM ] and the opportunity cost
of using manual payments, which is simply the expected surplus from trading
manually with a seller who accepts electronic payments, (1 − µs)[u(qE) − pEqE];
this terms is adjusted for the loss of the rebate rate r and the possibility that the
manual transaction is not completed, σ.
Let Sj denote the payoff to a seller who adopts payment method j = M,E.
Conjecturing an outcome in which buyers are never constrained in their purchases,
we have
VsM = A+ µbσ[qM(pM − g)− F ],
VsE = A+ µbσ[qE(pE − g)− F ] + (1− µb)[qˆE(εpE − g)− F ], (8)
Seller j does not observe the buyers’ method of payment before choosing the price
pj.
Clearly, qˆE = qEk(r) =
qE
(1− r)2 , hence
VsM − VsE = µbσ{qM(pM − g)− [qE(pE − g)]}
−(1− µb)
{
qE
(1− r)2 (εpE − g)− F
}
.
The choice of payment method µ′s of the generic seller must satisfy
µ′s =

1 if VsM − VsE > 0
[0, 1] if VsM − VsE = 0
0 if VsM − VsE < 0.
(9)
Two remarks are in order. First, we choose parameters so that qE(εpE−g) > F .
This not only implies qE(1− r)2 (εpE−g) > F for all r ≥ 1 but also qE(pE−g) > F ;
that is a seller who accepts electronic payments makes positive profits when he
engages either in an electronic or in a manual transaction (see Supplementary
Materials). Second, when pj satisfy (6), we have:
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• If µb = 0, then VsM − VsE < 0;
• If µb = 1, then VsM − VsE = 0 (because pM = pE = g), and
• If µb ∈ (0, 1), then VsM − VsE < 0 for ε < 1 sufficiently large.
To prove the last bullet point recall that qM(pM−g) > qE(pE−g) for all pM < pE.
The price pE monotonically falls to pM as µb grows to 1, while pM is invariant to
µb. Hence, qM(pM − g) > qE(pE− g) when ε < 1 or r > 0 and the first term of the
expression VsM − VsE is positive for all µb ∈ (0, 1). If µb = 0, then VsM − VsE < 0;
if µb = 1, then VsM − VsE = 0. In principle we could have VsM − VsE < 0 for
0 < µb ≤ µ¯b < 1, and VsM − VsE > 0 otherwise. However, µ¯b < 1 only if ε is
sufficiently small; otherwise, there is no µb ∈ (0, 1) that satisfies VsM −VsE = 0. To
see this note that for ε = 1 we have pE = pM , in which case VsM − VsE is negative
and increasing in µb. By continuity, this holds also for some ε < 1 sufficiently
close to 1. In the experiments we set parameters such that this was always the
case. It follows that VsM − VsE < 0 for all µb < 1.
It is now a matter of algebra to verify that the existence of equilibria in Propo-
sition A-1. The procedure is constructive. First, we conjecture that a given value
of µb is an equilibrium. Given this, we find the optimal value for µ′s using (9).
Imposing symmetry, µ′s = µs, we confirm whether the conjecture is correct for
some parameters by considering (7). If no parameters support the conjectured
value µb The details can be found in the Supplementary Materials. 2
Deriving the symmetric equilibrium µb and µs
In the following, we derive the symmetric equilibrium µb and µs for each treatment
using a constructive method. We let x, y denote arbitrary numbers in the open
unit interval.
No-Fee Here r = 0, ε = 1, hence η0 = η1. Consequently pM = pE and
qM = qE. We have:
VbM − VbE = [u(qM)− pMqM ](µs + σ − 1).
VsM − VsE = −(1− µb)[qM(pM − g)− F ]
• (µb, µs) = (0, 0) is always an equilibrium.
Conjecture µb = 0. In this case VsM−VsE < 0; Hence, µ′s = 0 from (9). Given
µ′s = µs = 0 (symmetry), we have VbM−VbE ≤ 0. If σ < 1, then VbM−VbE < 0;
here (7) implies µ′b = 0. If σ = 1, then VbM − VbE = 0—in which case (7)
implies µ′b = [0, 1]. Hence µ′b = 0 is always a best response when µs = 0, and
(µb, µs) = (0, 0) is always an equilibrium.
• (µb, µs) = (0, x), (0, 1) are never equilibria.
Conjecture µb = 0. In this case VsM − VsE < 0; Hence, µ′s = 0 from (9). This
contradicts µ′s = µs ∈ (0, 1] is a symmetric equilibrium.
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• (µb, µs) = (y, 0), is an equilibrium if σ = 1 but not if σ < 1.
Conjecture µb = y ∈ (0, 1). In this case VsM − VsE < 0 (for the parameters
selected, see discussion in the paper); Hence, µ′s = 0 from (9). When µ′s =
µs = 0 (symmetry), we have VbM −VbE ≤ 0. If σ = 1, then VbM −VbE = 0 (< 0
if σ < 1), in which case (7) implies µ′b = [0, 1]. Hence any µ′b = y ∈ (0, 1) is a
best response when µs = 0. Consequently, (µb, µs) = (y, 0) is an equilibrium
only if σ = 1.
• (µb, µs) = (y, x), (y, 1) are never equilibria.
Conjecture µb = y ∈ (0, 1). In this case VsM − VsE < 0; Hence, µ′s = 0 from
(9). This contradicts µ′s = µs ∈ (0, 1] is a symmetric equilibrium.
• (µb, µs) = (1, 0), is an equilibrium if σ = 1 but not if σ < 1.
Conjecture µb = 1. In this case VsM − VsE = 0; Hence, µ′s = [0, 1] from (9).
Given µ′s = µs = 0 (symmetry), it is clear that VbM − VbE = 0 only if σ = 1
(otherwise, it is < 0). In this case (7) implies µ′b = [0, 1]. Hence any µ′b = 1
is a best response to µs = 0; and (µb, µs) = (1, 0) is an equilibrium only if
σ = 1.
• (µb, µs) = (1, x), (1, 1) are equilibria with x ∈ (1− σ, 1).
Conjecture µb = 1. In this case VsM − VsE = 0; Hence, µ′s = [0, 1] from (9).
If µ′s = µs > 1− σ (symmetry), then VbM −VbE > 0. In this case, (7) implies
µ′b = 1. Consequently, (µb, µs) = (1, x) is an equilibrium if σ < 1 for any
x ∈ (1− σ, 1). It should be clear that this equilibrium is not robust to small
trembles in the choice of buyers. In that case µb < 1, hence VsM − VsE < 0.
So µ′s = 0. Finally, it is clear that (µb, µs) = (1, 1) is always an equilibrium.
Baseline Here r = 0, ε < 1, hence η0 < η1. Consequently pM < pE and
qM > qE for all µb < 1, while pM = pE and qM = qE for µb = 1. We have:
VbM − VbE = µsσ[u(qM)− pMqM ]− (1− µs)[u(qE)− pEqE](1− σ).
VsM − VsE = µbσ{qM(pM − g)− [qE(pE − g)]}
−(1− µb)[qE(εpE − g)− F ].
• (µb, µs) = (0, 0) is always an equilibrium.
Conjecture µb = 0. In this case VsM − VsE < 0; Hence, µ′s = 0 from (9).
Given µ′s = µs = 0 (symmetry), we claim that VbM − VbE ≤ 0. If σ < 1, then
VbM−VbE < 0; here (7) implies µ′b = 0. If σ = 1, then VbM−VbE = 0—in which
case (7) implies µ′b = [0, 1]. Hence µ′b = 0 is a best response when µs = 0,
and (µb, µs) = (0, 0) is always an equilibrium.
• (µb, µs) = (0, x), (0, 1) are never equilibria.
Conjecture µb = 0. In this case VsM−VsE < 0; Hence, µ′s = 0. This contradicts
µ′s = µs ∈ (0, 1] is a symmetric equilibrium.
• (µb, µs) = (y, 0), is an equilibrium if σ = 1 but not if σ < 1.
Conjecture µb = y ∈ (0, 1). In this case VsM − VsE < 0; Hence, µ′s = 0
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from (9). Given µ′s = µs = 0 (symmetry), VbM − VbE ≤ 0. If σ = 1, then
VbM − VbE = 0 (< 0 if σ < 1), in which case (7) implies µ′b = [0, 1]. Hence
µ′b = y is a best response when µs = 0. Consequently, (µb, µs) = (y, 0) is an
equilibrium only if σ = 1.
• (µb, µs) = (y, x), (y, 1) are never equilibria.
Conjecture µb = y ∈ (0, 1). In this case VsM − VsE < 0; Hence, µ′s = 0 from
(9). This contradicts µ′s = µs ∈ (0, 1] is a symmetric equilibrium.
• (µb, µs) = (1, 0) is not an equilibrium if σ < 1, and it is an equilibrium
otherwise.
Conjecture µb = 1. In this case VsM − VsE = 0 because pE = pM , hence
qM(pM −g) = qE(pE−g). It follows that µ′s = [0, 1] from (9). If µ′s = µs = 0
(symmetry), then VbM − VbE < 0, as long as σ < 1, hence µ′b = 0, from (7),
which is a contradiction. Otherwise, if sigma = 1 then VbM −VbE = 0; hence
µ′b = [0, 1], from (7), and (µb, µs) = (1, 0) is an equilibrium.
• (µb, µs) = (1, x) is an equilibrium if σ < 1 and x > 1− σ.
Conjecture µb = 1. In this case VsM − VsE = 0 because pE = pM , hence
qM(pM − g) = qE(pE − g). It follows that µ′s = [0, 1] from (9). If µ′s = µs =
x ∈ (0, 1) (symmetry), then VbM − VbE = [u(qM) − pMqM ](µs + σ − 1). If
µs > 1− σ we have VbM − VbE > 0. Hence, µ′b = 1 (from (7)). Consequently,
(µb, µs) = (1, x) is an equilibrium if σ < 1 for any x ∈ (1 − σ, 1). This
equilibrium is not robust to small trembles in the choice of buyers. In that
case µb < 1, hence pE > pM and VsM − VsE < 0. So µ′s = 0.
• (µb, µs) = (1, 1) is always an equilibrium.
Conjecture µb = 1. In this case VsM − VsE = 0 because pE = pM , hence
qM(pM −g) = qE(pE−g). It follows that µ′s = [0, 1] from (9). If µ′s = µs = 1
(symmetry), then VbM−VbE > 0. Hence, µ′b = 1, from (7) and (µb, µs) = (1, 1)
is an equilibrium.
Reward Here r = 0.05, ε < 1, hence η0 < η1. We have pM < pE and qM > qE
for all µb < 1, while pM = pE and qM = qE for µb = 1, with
VbM − VbE = µsσ[u(qM)− pMqM ]− (1− µs)[u(qE)− pEqE]
( 1
1− r − σ
)
.
VsM − VsE = µbσ{qM(pM − g)− [qE(pE − g)]}
−(1− µb)
{
qE
(1− r)2 (εpE − g)− F
}
.
• (µb, µs) = (0, 0) is always an equilibrium.
Conjecture µb = 0. In this case VsM − VsE < 0; Hence, µ′s = 0 from (9).
Given µ′s = µs = 0 (symmetry), VbM −VbE < 0 for any σ ≤ 1; here (7) implies
µ′b = 0. Hence (µb, µs) = (0, 0) is always an equilibrium.
• (µb, µs) = (0, x), (0, 1) are never equilibria.
Conjecture µb = 0. In this case VsM−VsE < 0; Hence, µ′s = 0. This contradicts
µ′s = µs ∈ (0, 1] is a symmetric equilibrium.
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• (µb, µs) = (y, 0), is never an equilibrium.
Conjecture µb = y ∈ (0, 1). In this case VsM − VsE < 0; Hence, µ′s = 0 from
(9). Given µ′s = µs = 0 (symmetry), VbM − VbE < 0 for all σ ≤ 1. Hence, (7)
implies µ′b = 0, which contradicts the conjecture µb = y ∈ (0, 1).
• (µb, µs) = (y, x), (y, 1) are never equilibria.
Conjecture µb = y ∈ (0, 1). In this case VsM − VsE < 0; Hence, µ′s = 0 from
(9). This contradicts µ′s = µs ∈ (0, 1] is a symmetric equilibrium.
• (µb, µs) = (1, 0) is never an equilibrium.
Conjecture µb = 1. In this case VsM − VsE = 0 because pE = pM , hence
qM(pM −g) = qE(pE−g). It follows that µ′s = [0, 1] from (9). If µ′s = µs = 0
(symmetry), then VbM−VbE = [u(qM)−pMqM ](
µs − 1
1− r +σ) < 0 always, hence
µ′b = 0, from (7), which is a contradiction.
• (µb, µs) = (1, x) is an equilibrium for x ∈ (1− σ(1− r), 1).
Conjecture µb = 1. In this case VsM − VsE = 0 because pE = pM , hence
qM(pM − g) = qE(pE − g). It follows that µ′s = [0, 1] from (9). If µ′s = µs =
x > 1−σ(1−r) (symmetry), then VbM−VbE = [u(qM)−pMqM ](
µs − 1
1− r +σ) > 0.
Hence, µ′b = 1 (from (7)). Consequently, (µb, µs) = (1, x) is an equilibrium
for all σ for any x ∈ (1−σ(1−r), 1). This equilibrium is not robust to small
trembles in the choice of buyers. In that case µb < 1, hence pE > pM and
VsM − VsE < 0. So µ′s = 0.
• (µb, µs) = (1, 1) is always an equilibrium.
Conjecture µb = 1. In this case VsM − VsE = 0 because pE = pM , hence
qM(pM −g) = qE(pE−g). It follows that µ′s = [0, 1] from (9). If µ′s = µs = 1
(symmetry), then VbM−VbE > 0. Hence, µ′b = 1, from (7) and (µb, µs) = (1, 1)
is an equilibrium.
The interiority of equilibrium
The experimental parameters are given by
F = 15, g = 60, θ = 169.5, σ = 1, ε = 0.9, r = 0.05,m ∈ [250, 350].
Buyers’ payment constraint never binds in equilibrium, so q is interior for any
value of µb that is consistent with equilibrium. To verify this note that
pMq(pM) =
θ2
2g , pEq(pE(1− r)) = pEk(r)q(pE) =
θ2
2g ×
η0
η1(1− r)2 .
Given the parameters, we have θ
2
2g = 239.5 < m; this implies that the equilibrium
is always interior in the No-Fee treatment, whether or not sellers accept manual
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payments. We also have η0
η1
< 1 when r = 0, which implies that if in the Baseline
treatment sellers accept electronic payments, then buyers are never constrained
in equilibrium. This is also true in the Baseline & Reward treatment since if
sellers accept electronic payments, then µb = 0; hence,
η0
η1
= 0.9, which implies
η0
η1(1− r)2 = 0.99 because
1
(1− r)2 = 1.1.
It is also immediate that given the parameters, sellers who accept electronic
payments make a positive profit also when a buyer pays manually, i.e., F <
q(pE)(εpE − g) holds.
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Appendix B: Additional Tables
Dep. var.: Payment’s method in comparison to the previous period
1=switch; 0= no switch
Model 1 Model 2
Failure t-1 0.808 ***
(0.098)
Electronic (median) 0.049 0.049
(0.244) (0.244)
Period -0.025 *** -0.025 ***
(0.004) (0.004)
No-Fee treatment -0.654 ** -0.654 **
(0.271) (0.271)
Reward treatment 0.089 0.089
(0.248) (0.248)
Failure manual t-1 0.809 ***
(0.133)
Failure electronic t-1 0.807 ***
(0.130)
Constant -0.905 *** -0.905 ***
(0.232) (0.232)
N.obs. 3168 3168
Table B-1: Dynamics in adoption of payment methods by buyers
Notes: probit regression with individual random effects. Data for period 7-40. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗,
∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
1
Failed transactions (%)
Manual Electronic
Time Underpay Total Time Underpay Declined Total
Baseline 52.1 47.9 100 3.9 13.7 82.4 100
No-Fee 55.6 44.4 100 8.1 29.7 62.2 100
Reward 64.7 35.3 100 15.4 9.2 75.4 100
Table B-2: Why transactions failed
Notes: Time= the transaction was not completed within the time limit. Underpay= the trans-
action was not completed because the buyer did not transfer a sufficient number of tokens to
the seller. Declined= the seller did not accept electronic payments. Data for periods 7-40.
2
Dependent variable: Electronic
Posted prices Baseline No-Fee Reward Declined
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Accept electronic 18.260 ** -15.096 7.815
(7.600) (10.533) (7.686)
No- Fee treatment 27.938
(22.451)
Reward treatment 12.134
(18.019)
Period -0.295 -0.787 *** -0.556 *** 0.305
(0.180) (0.161) (0.184) (0.487)
Purdue location 24.602 ** -20.561 -12.072 -11.745
(11.516) (18.108) (12.466) (16.495)
Constant 170.075 *** 233.780 *** 214.349 *** 183.832 ***
(11.481) (16.528) (11.736) (19.320)
N.obs. 1088 1088 1088 252
R squared 0.040 0.033 0.016 0.015
Table B-3: Treatment effect on prices
Notes: OLS regression with individual random effect. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate signifi-
cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Appendix C: Experimental Instructions (Reward
treatment)
Stefania: include figures and tables.
This is an experiment in decision-making. The National Science Foundation
and Purdue University have provided funds for this research. You can earn money
based on the decisions you and the other participants make in the experiment.
Please turn off your cell-phones, do not talk to others and do not look at their
screens. These instructions are a detailed description of the procedures we will
follow. You will benefit from understanding them well.
How do you earn money?
In the experiment you will either be a seller or a buyer of a good. The exper-
imental currency for trading is called tokens and will be converted into dollars.
For every 100 tokens you earn, you will receive 7 cents (.07).Y ouwillalsobepaida5
show up fee. All earnings will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
In each period, you make some choices:
• You must choose a method of payment, i.e., how to settle trades.
• You must make trading decisions:
• If you are a seller, then you choose a price for the good you sell. You earn
tokens depending on the price at which you sell and on the quantity sold.
The seller’s table (see later) reports earnings for different combinations of
quantities and prices.
• If you are a buyer, you receive an endowment of tokens and then you choose
a quantity to buy. You can earn tokens if you buy at a price lower than your
utility value. The buyer’s table (see later) reports utility values in tokens
for different quantities bought.
How long will the experiment last?
This session will last 40 periods.
In the room there are 8 sellers and 8 buyers. The computer assigns you a
role through a coin flip and you keep the same role for whole duration of the
experiment.
At the beginning of each period, every seller meets a buyer who is selected
at random. Therefore, most likely you will interact with different participants in
different periods because there is only one chance out of eight to have the same
trading partner in two consecutive periods. No matter what participants choose
to do, every seller is always equally likely to meet any buyer. Moreover, you will
not be able to tell whether you have met before your trading partner, because you
will not see her identity.
What exactly do you need to do in each period?
Each period has the following timeline:
1
Figure C-1: Choice of payment method for a buyer
Figure C-2: Choice of payment method for a buyer
1. Buyers receive an endowment of tokens
2. Everyone chooses a payment method for trading in the period THEN A
TRADING CLOCK STARTS
3. Each seller meets a buyer and chooses the price for the good
4. Each buyer decides how much to buy at the given price
5. Buyers carry out payments THEN THE TRADING CLOCK STOPS
6. Everyone sees their outcome
We now discuss each of the above items in detail:
1. At the beginning of each period, each buyer receives a random amount be-
tween 250 and 350 tokens. This endowment can be used to buy goods or
can be simply kept.
2. At this point, buyers and sellers independently choose a payment method for
their trades, which is either a manual or an electronic transfer of tokens.
How these methods work will be explained in a moment. Sellers always
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accept manual payments and can choose to accept electronic payments, also.
Buyers must choose to make either a manual or an electronic payment, but
not both (Figure C-1). You will be asked to choose a payment method
each period.
There is a fee charged for electronic transfers and no fee for manual transfers.
The fee is always paid by the seller and never by the buyer. The seller pays
a proportional fee for each electronic payment received: the fee is 10 tokens
for every 100 tokens received.
Buyers receive a proportional rebate for each electronic payment made. A
buyer receives 5 tokens for every 100 tokens paid using an electronic transfer.
As soon as methods of payments are chosen, a trading clock starts. The
clock displays the remaining seconds to complete a trade in a large red font
on your screen (Figure C-2). Initially the available time is 120 seconds; from
period 7 it will be reduced to 60 seconds.
3. When the trading clock starts, each seller must choose the unit price for the
goods. The price must be an integer number between 0 and 400. Then,
sellers must click the button Confirm.
Seller’s earnings vary according to the price and quantity sold, as illustrated
in the Seller’s table. Each row of the table lists earnings for a given price of
0, 10, 20, ...., 400. Sellers can use the table to guide their choice of price.
Let’s see an example.
Example: Find the row with a price of 390. As you can see, the seller?s
earnings change depending on the quantity sold. The seller picks the price
but it is the buyer who picks the quantity. If nothing is sold, then the seller’s
earnings are fixed at 350 tokens. If a quantity = 1 is sold, then earnings are
665 tokens. If a quantity = 2 is sold, then earnings are 995 tokens. And so
on. For quantities and prices not listed in the table you can approximate
earnings by looking at the nearby cells. Note that for some prices the seller
has a loss.
Figure C-3 displays the same information contained in the seller’s table. In
the horizontal axis find the price 390. The corresponding earnings are on
the curve labeled quantity = 1 and quantity = 2.
Now take a moment to find the seller’s earning if a quantity=3 is sold at a
price of 390 tokens. Any question at this point?
4. After the seller has chosen a price, the buyer must decide how many units
of the good to purchase, by typing any number between 0 and 4 (Figure
C-2. –The amount due is the price multiplied by the quantity requested.
Buyers are never endowed with more than 350 tokens to spend in a period.
This endowment is placed in the account selected at the beginning of the
period (manual or electronic). The endowment leftover after purchases will
be redeemed for dollars. –Goods generate a utility value in tokens for the
buyer, as shown in the buyer’s table. Earnings are equal to the utility
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Figure C-3: Sellers’ period earnings
value minus the amount due plus any rebate earned. Buyers can use the
table to guide their purchases.
Example: if you buy a quantity of 0.5 at a price of 390 tokens, the amount
due is 195 tokens, which is 0.5 times 390. If you use manual payments, the
earnings are 44.7 tokens. If you use electronic payments, the earnings are
instead 54.5 tokens, i.e., 44.7 tokens plus a rebate of 195 x 0.05=9.8 tokens.
The computer calculates this for you: type in the quantity requested, then
click the Calculate amounts button. You can repeat this process as many
times as you wish. To finalize your purchase, you must click on the Proceed
to payment button.
How can a buyer calculate period earnings without the computer? Just look
at the buyer’s table. Each row indicates a quantity of goods: 0, 0.10, 0.20,
.... up to 4. For each quantity the table shows the utility value of those
goods. Now, find the row for a quantity of 0.5. The corresponding utility
value is 239.7 tokens. Did everyone find it? Suppose the buyer uses manual
payments. If the price is 390, as in the example above, then the buyer earns
44.7 tokens, i.e., a utility of 239.7 minus an amount due of 390x0.5. Consider
instead a price of 111 tokens per unit: then the buyer’s earnings are 184.2
tokens, i.e., a utility of 239.7 minus an amount due of (111x0.5). If the buyer
uses electronic payments you have to add a 5% rebate: 9.8 tokens when the
price is 390, and 2.8 tokens when the price is 111.
Figure C-4 displays the same information as in the buyer?s table. Now,
please find a quantity = 0.5 on the horizontal axis. The corresponding utility
value on the curve is 239.7 tokens, which can be read with some approxi-
mation on the vertical axis. Recall that to obtain the buyer?s earnings you
need to take this utility value and then subtract the amount paid. displays
the same information as in the buyer?s table. Now, please find a quantity
= 0.5 on the horizontal axis. The corresponding utility value on the curve
is 239.7 tokens, which can be read with some approximation on the vertical
axis. Recall that to obtain the buyer?s earnings you need to take this utility
value and then subtract the amount paid.
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Figure C-4: Buyers’ utility value of goods
Any question at this point?
Once a purchasing decision is made, the payment can be carried out. The
buyer had already decided earlier in the period whether to pay electronically
or manually.
• Electronic payment: the buyer must click the ?Proceed to payment?
button and tokens are automatically taken from the buyer’s electronic
account.
• Manual payment: the buyer must select a proper combination of
tokens from the manual account (Figure C-5).
The choices described in items (3) to (5) above must be completed within
the available time.
5. At the end of the period, you will see whether trade took place. Trade can-
not take place:
(a) if a buyer pays electronically but the seller does not accept
electronic payments;
(b) if the buyer has insufficient tokens available in the relevant
account;
(c) if the buyer manually selects to transfer less than the amount
due;
(d) if the clock runs out before trade is settled.
If trade does not take place within the available time, then cumulative earn-
ings for the buyer increase by the received endowment (between 250 and 350
tokens), and increase by 350 tokens for the seller.
The results screen (Figure C-6) displays details of the trade, for 30 seconds.
Seller’s earnings reflect the table values minus any applicable payment fee,
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Figure C-5: How to pay a seller from the manual account
Notes: The manual account contains tokens of various sizes. To break a large-size token into a
smaller size, select a token and then click the button Change. To select the tokens, click on
any Available tokens and then press the button Select. Selected tokens are indicated with
*****. Press Deselect to undo the selection. To transfer the selected tokens to the seller, a
buyer must click the button Pay. A trade is completed when a buyer transfers enough tokens,
i.e., equal or more than the amount due. It is not completed if the transfer is less than the
amount due.
plus possible excess payments. Buyer’s earnings reflect the utility values in
the table minus the payment, plus any applicable payment rebate. ID is
your experimental ID.
The lower part of the screen will always display your trade record for pre-
vious periods. This includes the payment method selected by you and
by the person you encountered, price and quantity traded, your period
earnings in tokens, your endowment in tokens (only for buyers), and your
cumulative earnings in tokens. Cumulative earnings will be redeemed for
dollars at the end of the experiment. Use the record sheet to record your
earnings.
Figure C-6: Results screen for a buyer
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Questions? Now is time for questions. Do you have any questions before we
begin the experiment?
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Figure C-7: BUYER’S TABLE: buyer’s utility values in tokens for each quantity
purchased of the good
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Figure C-8: SELLER’S TABLE: earnings in tokens if a quantity of the good is
sold at the price indicated
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